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HIRSH AMENT*
Predatory Lending: What Will Stop It?
PREDATORY LENDING HAS, IN RECENT YEARS, received increasingly negative public-
ity.' With predatory lending costing borrowers an average of nine billion dollars a
year,2 scholars and politicians alike are scrambling to find a solution.' Legislative
and regulatory neglect only compound the problem.' Many existing federal laws
have loopholes-the best of which only force predatory lenders to adapt their tac-
tics-and states' action, for the most part proving equally ineffective, with the vast
majority of state statutes simply mirroring unsuccessful federal regulation.'
To this point, a valid solution for the problem of predatory lending does not yet
exist. The fact that scholars, economists, and politicians alike have struggled to even
define the practice further complicates the issue. Unable to provide a coherent defi-
nition, scholars instead catalogue the practices associated with predatory lending.6
By managing the definitional problem through cataloging, scholars propose a num-
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1. Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course
Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 507 (2002) ("Predatory lending is a scourge of the modern American
financial system").
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Anna Beth Ferguson, Predatory Lending: Practices, Remedies and Lack of Adequate Protection
for Ohio Consumers, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 607, 635 (2000) (suggesting that legislatures expand the Mortgage
Loan Act and the Consumer Sales and Practices Act); see also Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of
Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1259, 1317-66 (2002)
[hereinafter Engel & McCoy, Three Marketsl (proposing a duty of suitability in the subprime mortgage lending
market).
4. See Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1305-08, 1311-14 (demonstrating how federal
legislation, such as the Home Owners and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), has many loopholes which allow
predatory lenders to continue to operate).
5. Id. at 1308-09; see David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lend-
ing to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 1023-51 (2006) (noting that, in
addition to state predatory lending laws, state attorneys general have initiated lawsuits and regulators have
taken administrative action; but noting that the holder in due course doctrine has stood in the way of remedies
for predatory lending victims).
6. See infra Part I.
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ber of solutions centering on statutory and regulatory adjustments.7 In the process,
most academics have brushed aside the idea of solving this problem through the
common law, or more specifically, through contract law.' In response, this com-
ment proposes a new solution arising out of the contract defense of
unconscionability.9
This comment analyzes predatory lending in four separate parts. I begin with a
general discussion of predatory lending.1" From there, I turn to an explanation of
the prime, subprime, and predatory markets." To properly understand why preda-
tory lending has been so successful, one must necessarily see how it differs from the
prime and subprime markets. 2 The third part of this comment focuses on the legal
remedies that lawmakers and the courts developed to regulate the mortgage market
and consequently predatory lending. 3 This includes an explanation of why current
state and federal law remains so ineffective in preventing predatory lending.'4 The
final section of this comment advocates the use of the unconscionability doctrine as
a means to stem foreclosures resulting from predatory lending. 5
I. DEFINING PREDATORY LENDING
Without a universal definition for predatory lending, substitute explanations come
in various forms. Some state that "you know predatory lending when you see it," 6
while others describe predatory lending "as a catalog of onerous lending prac-
tices." 7 Most scholars use the catalogue approach because it "provides a useful
starting point for detecting and describing the pathologies that underlie predatory
lending.""
The nature of predatory lending, generally, "benefit[s] mortgage brokers, lend-
ers, and securitizers" and works to the detriment of the borrower. 9 Engle and Mc-
Coy, for example, list a number of abuses against borrowers:"
7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
8. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1299-1301 (detailing the ineffectiveness of the equita-
ble principle of unconscionability found in section 2-302 of the UCC).
9. See infra Part IV.C.
10. See infra Part 1.
11. See infra Part II.A.-B.
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part III.C.
15. See infra Part IV.C.
16. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1260.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning A Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending,
75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2039, 2043 (2007) [hereinafter Engel & McCoy, Blind Eye].
20. Id. at 2043-45.
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(1) "Loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to
borrowers[;]"21
(2) "Rent seeking[;]"22
(3) "Loans involving illegal fraud or deception[;]"'
(4) "Other forms of non-transparency that do not amount to fraud[;]" 4
(5) "Loans requiring borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress[;]" '25
(6) "Lending discrimination[; and]"2 6
(7) "Servicing abuses[.]"'"
Although this list does not exhaust predatory lending practices, most incidents
involve two or more of the aforementioned practices." Most of these abuses are not
necessarily illegal. 29 To the contrary; most of these practices are legal or "regu-
lated."3 The legality of most predatory lending practices is what in part presents a
major barrier to the borrower's recovery.1
Importantly, however, a catalogue approach is not the only accepted way to de-
fine predatory lending.12 Both governmental agencies and the courts prefer the use
of a more succinct definition. For example, a joint report between the U.S. Depart-
21. Id. at 2043. "A major example is asset-based lending, which consists of loans to borrowers whom the
lender knows cannot afford the monthly payments. Pushing borrowers... to subprime loans, and refinancing
low-interest loans into costlier loans with no justification can also inflict seriously disproportionate net harm
on borrowers." Id.
22. Id. at 2044. "Numerous subprime loans charge fees and interest rates that are exorbitant compared to
the risk that the borrowers present. Rent seeking also encompasses steering and charging prepayment penalties
and points without a corresponding cut in the interest rate, as is customary in the prime market." Id.
23. Id. "Many predatory loans involve fraud or deception by brokers or lenders. For example, brokers or
lenders may procure inflated appraisals or make false promises to refinance loans down the road on better
terms." Id.
24. Id.
These occur when lenders or brokers withhold information from borrowers in circumstances that fall
short of fraud. For example, subprime lenders keep rate sheets containing their prices secret because
they do not want borrowers to shop for better rates. Neither the Truth in Lending Act nor the Real
Estate Settlement Procedure Act requires disclosure of rate sheets to borrowers. This secrecy impedes
comparison shopping.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
25. Id. "Subprime loans often contain mandatory arbitration clauses that require borrowers to take dis-
putes to arbitration and preclude them from joining class actions. Such provisions deny borrowers access to the
courts." Id.
26. Id. "Many predatory loans impose more onerous terms on members of protected groups, resulting in
discrimination even after controlling for risk." Id.
27. Id. at 2044-45. "Once loans are securitized, a servicer typically becomes responsible for collecting the
loan payments and distributing the proceeds. Some servicers have employed abusive servicing practices, includ-
ing charging unjustified fees, actively pushing borrowers into default, and employing exploitative collection
methods." Id.
28. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1261.
29. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 611.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See infra notes 33-34.
VOL. 4 NO. 2 2009
PREDATORY LENDING: WHAT WILL STOP IT?
ment of Housing and Urban Development and the U.S. Department of the Trea-
sury provided the following definition:
Predatory lending-whether undertaken by creditors, brokers, or even home
improvement contractors-involves engaging in deception or fraud, manipu-
lating the borrower through aggressive sales tactics, or taking unfair advantage
of a borrower's lack of understanding about loan terms ... that, alone or in
combination, are abusive or make the borrower more vulnerable to abusive
practices.3
Similarly, at least one court adopted Daniel S. Ehrenberg's definition of preda-
tory lending, calling it:
[A] mismatch between the needs and capacity of the borrower .... In essence,
the loan does not fit the borrower, either because the borrower's underlying
needs for the loan are not being met or the terms of the loan are so disadvanta-
geous to that particular borrower that there is little likelihood that the bor-
rower has the capability to repay the loan. 4
Nevertheless, the array of definitions and different attempts to characterize pred-
atory lending underscore the fact that predatory lending is easier to discuss than to
define.
II. EVOLVING MARKETS
Without a doubt, the proliferation of predatory lending results from a whole host
of factors." However, most commentators agree that the problems of predatory
lending trace back to the changes in the mortgage market over the past twenty to
thirty years. 6
In the 1970s, the American mortgage market involved a simple and intimate
process.37 Most Americans who wanted to buy a home went to savings banks, sav-
33. HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LEND-
ING 1 (2000), available at http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl2/pressrel/treasrpt.pdf.
34. Daniel S. Ehrenberg, If the Loan Doesn't Fit, Don't Take It: Applying the Suitability Doctrine to the
Mortgage Industry to Eliminate Predatory Lending, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 117,
119-20 (2001); see also Assocs. Home Equity Servs. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 536-37 (N.J. Super. 2001).
35. See, e.g., Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption
and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1323-40 (2006) (discussing the causes of predatory
lending as including separating investors from the problems, the "holder-in-due-course doctrine," providing
additional insulation through securitization, the increase in the availability of subprime credit, failures of the
market, and the "federal preemption of state consumer protection measures").
36. See id. at 1323 (noting the changes in the mortgage market).
37. Id. (detailing how most mortgages involved primarily the borrower and the local depositor, called a
thrift).
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ings and loan associations, or mutual savings banks, otherwise known as thrifts.3"
Upon arrival, the thrift evaluated an individual's application, taking into account
income, wealth, and ties to the community, and the loan officer would then either
approve or reject the application.39 Typically, only those individuals with good cre-
dentials-steady work history, good credit, and a large down payment-would re-
ceive approval.4"
Thrifts not only acted as the central provider of mortgages, "but they also verti-
cally dominated the residential mortgage market,"' meaning that in addition to
financing mortgages, thrifts would typically hold onto the mortgage until the bor-
rower paid it off or the property was foreclosed.42 Thus, the thrift or finance com-
pany that created the loan also performed the "origination, servicing, and
ownership functions associated with the loan."'3
In the 1980s, an increase in available capital led to the emergence of new types of
lenders and, in the process, dramatically altered the mortgage landscape." The in-
crease in capital resulted from several changes in the financial markets," most no-
tably the securitization of home mortgages.46
A. Securitization
"Securitization is the financial technology that integrates the market for residential
mortgages with the capital markets." 7 Specifically, the loan originator, after com-
pleting the loan, bundles and transfers the loan to an entity, often known as
a "special-purpose vehicle" ("SPV"), which "is owned by, but legally distinct
from, the lender. The SPV then resells the loan pool to a second SPV," again
independent of the lender."9 Then, an "investment bank for the issuer carves
the principal and interest payments into tranches ° of bonds."'" Rating agencies
then go through a detailed process, 2 giving each tranche an investment-grade
38. Reiss, supra note 5, at 992.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 992-93.
41. Id. at 993.
42. Forrester, supra note 35, at 1323.
43. Id. at 1323-24.
44. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1273.
45. Id. This includes the availability of new mortgage products and incentives for lenders to increase their
lending activity in low and middle income neighborhoods. Id.
46. Id.
47. Engel & McCoy, Blind Eye, supra note 19, at 2045.
48. This is typically in the form of the trust. Id.
49. Id.
50. A tranche represents levels of debt. John T. Lynch, Comment, Credit Derivatives: Industry Initiative
Supplants Need for Direct Regulatory Intervention-A Model for the Future of U.S. Regulation?, 55 BUFF. L. REV.
1371, 1386 (2008).
51. Engel & McCoy, Blind Eye, supra note 19, at 2046.
52. Id. "(R] ating agencies gauge the credit risk of each tranche by comparing the loan pool's characteristics
with historical data and forecasting the tranche's performance. In calculating credit risk, however, rating agen-
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rating. 3 Investment banks then "price the mortgage-backed securities and sell them
to investors, either through a public offering or a private placement."54 In turn, the
original lenders receive two separate forms of revenue from the (1) sale of securities
and (2) "the right to any interest on the loans that exceeds the interest paid to the
investors after deducting expenses on the asset-backed bonds," known as the "ex-
cess spread.55 Accordingly, securitization allows "investors in asset-backed securi-
ties [to] come to own 'the rights to the present and future economic value of the
assets,'" and simultaneously provides increased capital to the residential mortgage
market.56
In addition to providing an increase in available funds, 7 securitization reduces
risks for investors.5 The "two-tiered [loan] structure protects investors by prevent-
ing lenders' creditors from reaching the assets backing the securities in case the
lender goes bankrupt." 9 Investors further protect themselves by bundling, a process
by which an investor's loss or gain no longer hinges on one mortgage but rather on
a group of loans.6"
B. A Market for Subprime Loans
The increased supply of available funding provided by the vertical mortgage mar-
ket6' (i.e. securitization) made loans available for more people than ever before.62
Out of this came the birth of the subprime mortgage market.63 With the influx of
capital, lenders found themselves free to loan to individuals who presented elevated
credit risk (subprime borrowers) and as a result, lenders charged these borrowers
cies do not assess the suitability of the underlying loans for individual borrowers." Id. at 2046-47 (citation
omitted).
53. Id. at 2047.
The tranches are arrayed from the most senior to the most junior, with "as many as five mezzanine or
subordinate tranches going down the ratings ladder" from AAA to B. The senior class is the AAA
tranche, the mezzanine class consists of the AA and A tranches, and the BBB, BB, B and unrated
classes take the junior position .... [In this system,] the senior tranche is paid off ... [and then] the
next tranche moves to the head of the line for principal payments until all of the tranches are retired.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
54. Id. at 2048.
55. Id.
56. Reiss, supra note 5, at 1002.
57. Engel & McCoy, Blind Eye, supra note 19, at 2048.
58. See Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1274 ("[Ciredit enhancements [also] have the
effect of reducing the risks associated with defaults.").
59. Engel & McCoy, Blind Eye, supra note 19, at 2046.
60. Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDozo L. REV. 2185, 2213 (2007) (noting
that pooling (or bundling) mortgages together allows investors to "have a relatively reliable prediction of ex-
pected returns").
61. That is, the market created through securitization. See supra Part lI.A.
62. Peterson, supra note 60, at 2213 (noting that securitization has "increased consumer access to purchase
money mortgages, home equity lines of credit, and cash-out refinancing").
63. Id. at 2214 (indicating that by the early 1990s securitization became entrenched and "[i]t was also in
this period that the country saw an explosion in [the] relatively new and aggressive form of 'subprime' mort-
gage lending").
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interest and fees that exceeded that of those in the traditional "prime" mortgage
market.64 Despite facing increased risk, lower loan amounts, higher costs to origi-
nate and service loans, and faster payments, borrowers continued to apply for sub-
prime loans.6" In fact, from 1994 to 1999, the subprime market went from being
non-existent to a 500-billion-dollar-a-year-industry.66
C. Subprime Markets Open the Door for Predatory Markets
Along with an increase in capital, the changing mortgage market generated infor-
mational asymmetries in two separate contexts. First, "lenders and secondary-mar-
ket purchasers have different levels of knowledge about the borrowers' risks[,] ...
enabl[ing] lenders to gain an advantage by withholding information .... ,,6 At the
same time, informational asymmetries exist between lenders and inexperienced
borrowers, who traditionally found themselves disconnected from the credit mar-
ket.68 Exploiting this second set of informational asymmetries provided lenders
with a golden opportunity to engage in predatory tactics.69
In a predatory market, 7° lenders and brokers have extensive knowledge about
credit and mortgage markets, while at the opposite end are borrowers with rela-
tively little sophistication when it comes to mortgage markets.71 Previously, these
naive borrowers were "excluded from the home-mortgage market because of credit
rationing and discrimination." 72 With new capital, predatory lenders have become
all too willing to approach and proposition unsophisticated, first-time borrowers.
The introduction of complex documents detailing payments and percentages only
compounds the problem.74
Once borrowers sign and commit to a predatory loan, it is only a matter of time
before those same borrowers cannot afford their mortgage payments. 75 At this
point, predatory lenders are ready to "work with" the borrower to help avoid fore-
closure.76 Taking full advantage of the borrowers' vulnerability, predatory lenders
engage in the well-known practice of "flipping," which enables a "borrower to re-
64. id.
65. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 611.
66. id.
67. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1280.
68. Eggert, supra note 1, at 520.
69. Id.
70. 'The predatory market generally exists as a subset of the subprime market." Deanne Loonin & Eliza-
beth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The Growing Debt Burdens of Older Consumers and Related Policy Recom-
mendations, 44 HARV. J. LEGIS. 167, 178 (2007).
71. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1280.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1281.
74. Id. at 1280-81 ("[Wihen lenders and brokers give these borrowers estimates and loan documents, the
borrowers may not be able to comprehend the information").
75. See id. at 1281.
76. Id.
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peatedly refinance the original mortgage."" While flipping sounds enticing to a
borrower because it staves off foreclosure, in actuality each time the lender flips the
loan, it adds fees and increases profits.78 Put another way, each time a lender flips
an old loan, it becomes a brand new loan, which removes the equity from the loan
without providing a benefit to the borrower.79
In addition to flipping, two other common predatory lending practices include
"stripping" and "packing." ' Stripping occurs where a lender makes a loan knowing
that the borrower cannot repay it, resulting in foreclosure and the additional loss of
the equity previously built up by the borrower.8 Packing occurs when lenders add
other services to the loans.82 These services usually take the form of different insur-
ances, which borrowers neither need nor can afford. 3 Lenders find packing very
lucrative because when the borrower refinances to stave off foreclosure, the lender
"does not have to refund any of the premiums paid by the borrower."84
III. PREDATORY REGULATION
Regulations exist to combat predatory lending, but effective regulations do not.85 If
nothing else, the prevalence of predatory lending demonstrates the ineffectiveness
of existing regulation. 6 There are a number of problems that have persisted
throughout the predatory lending market, despite the current regulations.87
A. Fraud: A Problem That Regulation Can Resolve
One of the more egregious forms of predatory lending involves fraud. 8 As opposed
to many other types of predatory lending, fraud can be deterred through tradi-
tional legal remedies. Put simply, fraud violates existing law. 9 In addition to state
fraud and consumer protection laws, lending fraud also violates federal disclosure
77. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 609.
78. id.
79. Id. at 609-10.
80. Id. at 609.
81. Id.
82. Eggert, supra note 1, at 517.
83. Id.
84. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 610.
85. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 60, at 2255 (commenting that most consumer protection statutes "pre-
ceded widespread securitization of subprime mortgages by over a decade[, and wihile this time frame is not
meaningful in itself, it hints at a fundamental structural problem in the law").
86. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 3, at 612 (noting that with the advent of subprime loans and more
directly predatory lending there has been a 200% increase in foreclosure rates since 1980, with over half a
million in 1997).
87. See infra Part III.B.
88. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1267 ("The most blatant forms of predatory lending
involve the age-old problem of fraud.").
89. Id. These laws include: "state fraud statutes, state consumer-protection laws, state fiduciary duties, and
federal disclosure statutes such as the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) or the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA)." Id.
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statutes-namely the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)9° and the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (RESPA). 9"
Two basic forms of fraud exist in the predatory lending market.92 In both situa-
tions, the lender is the culprit." The first form targets borrowers and involves lend-
ers' "failures to disclose information as required by law," using bait-and-switch
tactics,94 and creating loans in conjunction with home repair scams.9 The second
type of fraud aims to deceive those individuals who provide capital resources; usu-
ally this means purchasers of loans in the secondary market.96 Here, lenders typi-
cally falsify loan applications or inflate real estate appraisals.97
B. Predatory Market: A Regulatory Failure
Although regulations effectively combat fraud, less overt methods of predatory
lending continue undeterred.98 The difference between fraud and deceptive prac-
tices, which fall into this category, is that fraud violates existing law whereas these
deceptive practices merely skirt current regulations.9 Some of the most widely
publicized and criticized regulations have come in the form of disclosure laws and
price regulations. 00 Specifically, three federal regulations mandate disclosure and
price regulation in one form or another: TILA, RESPA, and the most promising of
the three, HOEPA. ° l
"TILA requires lenders to disclose finance charges and annual percentage rates to
applicants for home mortgages." ''"2 RESPA has a similar effect by entitling home-
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693(c) (2006).
91. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2006).
92. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1267. While there are two main types of fraud that
infect the predatory market, in reality there are endless forms. Id.
93. Id. at 1267-68.
94. See Michael O'Donnell & Katherine Planer, If It Sounds Too Good to Be True: Identifying and Avoiding
Common Mortgage Fraud Scams, N.J. LAw., Oct. 2008, at 54, 55.
Here "the homeowner does not realize that he or she is surrendering ownership of the house in
exchange for a 'rescue."' The owner deeds ownership to the rescue service using a quit-claim deed, in
an effort to prevent foreclosure. The owner believes he or she is signing documents for a new loan to
bring the mortgage up to date. The homeowner is promised that he or she can buy back the home at
a later time, but before the homeowner has an opportunity to repurchase, the rescue service has sold
the home to another buyer.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
95. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1267.
96. Id. at 1268.
97. Id.
98. See Reiss, supra note 5, at 1026 (noting the limited protection provided by federal law).
99. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1268.
100. See generally Ferguson, supra note 3, at 616-22 (discussing the limited relief provided by TILA, RESPA,
and HOEPA).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
102. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1305.
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owners "to good-faith estimates of settlement costs ... and statements of their
actual closing costs in HUD-1 settlement statements. "103
In response to a rising number of incidents related to predatory lending, Con-
gress in 1994 enacted HOEPA °4 Importantly, "HOEPA defines certain home mort-
gage loans as 'high cost' loans and, with respect to [such] loans, requires particular
disclosures and prohibits designated unfair terms."'0 5 Specifically, "HOEPA prohib-
its lenders from engaging 'in a pattern or practice' of making high-cost loans with-
out regard to the borrower's ability to repay."' °6 Moreover, "[u]nder HOEPA['s]
advance-disclosure provisions, the lender must inform the borrower of the APR,
the dollar amount of the periodic payments, the size of any balloon payments, the
amount borrowed, and any charges for optional credit insurance or debt-cancella-
tion coverage."" 7 Additionally, HOEPA mandates that lenders "advise borrowers in
writing that they could lose their homes . . . ."'0 Still more promising, "HOEPA
eliminates holder in due course status for purchasers of HOEPA-covered loans,"
and as a result, "assignees of HOEPA loans are subject to all claims and defenses
that the homeowner could have asserted against the original lender."'0 9 Finally,
HOEPA requires disclosure of interest rates and monthly payment increases."'
Moreover, all three of these statutes authorize private right of action."' HOEPA
offers the widest range of remedies, allowing private individuals expanded rights of
recession to stave off foreclosure for up to three years and the right to collect spe-
cial enhanced damages consisting of all finance charges and fees." 2 TILA offers
similar remedies, save the expanded right of rescission and special enhanced dam-
ages. "' RESPA limits private remedies compared to those of TILA and HOEPA." 4
For borrowers to collect remedies under RESPA, they must prove that lenders: (1)
failed to inform them that their loans could be transferred, (2) received kickbacks,
or (3) steered them to title companies-no easy task.' In addition to private rights
103. Id.
104. Home Owners and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 151, 108 Stat. 2160, 2190
(1994).
105. Forrester, supra note 35, at 1316.
HOEPA initially defined high-cost home mortgage loans as those with an annual percentage rate
more than ten points above Treasury bill rates or with points and fees exceeding the greater of eight
percent of the loan amount or $400, but the Act provides for adjustment by the Federal Reserve
Board after two years.
Id.
106. Id. at 1316-17.
107. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1305.
108. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(2)(B) (2006).
109. Forrester, supra note 35, at 1317.
110. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1305.
111. Id. at 1306.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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of action, all three statutes include agency enforcement."' Furthermore, violators
of TILA and HOEPA may face criminal prosecution." 7
It would seem that HOEPA, TILA, and RESPA serve as the perfect solutions to
predatory lending, but their practical ineffectiveness diminishes their promise."'
Numerous loopholes in the aforementioned statutes allow lenders to avoid disclos-
ing many of their deceptive practices.' TILA failed in large part due to the "long
list of closing costs," which the regulations do not include when computing finance
charges and annual percentage rates.' RESPA remains equally ineffective-the re-
sult of long and unclear good faith settlement costs and HUD- 1 statements that are
too late and unreliable to help borrowers. 2'
HOEPA had great promise, but like TILA and RESPA, it has not realized its
potential. The narrow scope of HOEPA serves as its fatal flaw.'22 More specifically,
HOEPA is inapplicable to purchase-money mortgages or open-ended credit lines of
any kind. " Additionally, even if a mortgage is within its scope, HOEPA does not
apply unless lenders charge interest or total points exceeding a given percentage."'
Therefore, a lender can circumvent HOEPA by categorizing a loan as an open-
ended extension or by keeping interest and fees below HOEPA percentage require-
ments. 2 ' Simply stated, predatory lenders with all too much frequency are able to
avoid HOEPA regulations.
Even HOEPA's attempt to eliminate or limit holder in due course status falls
short. For one, HOEPA limits the liability of assignees of the mortgage loan, to the
total amount of the debt paid and remaining unpaid.'26 Moreover, "HOEPA pro-
vides a safe harbor for assignees who can demonstrate that 'a reasonable person
exercising ordinary due diligence, could not determine ... that the mortgage was [a
HOEPA-covered loan].'" 27
C. Attempted State Regulation
In response to the failure of federal regulations, states created their own disclosure
regulations. 2 Many of these disclosure regulations mimic federal regulations and
116. Id. at 1305.
117. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1644 (2006).
118. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
119. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1306-07.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1307.
122. Eggert, supra note 1, at 587 (noting that HOEPA seems "too easy to evade").
123. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i), (w), (bb) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(2) (2006).
124. Eggert, supra note 1, at 587.
125. Id.
126. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1).
127. Forrester, supra note 35, at 1317.
128. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1308. See generally Reiss, supra note 5, at 1028-51
(referencing New Jersey, North Carolina, and Georgia-three of the more recognized state attempts to regulate
predatory lending).
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employ necessary modifications as deemed by the states." 9 For example, North
Carolina in 1999 enacted the first predatory lending statute, which it patterned
after HOEPA. 3 ° Learning from the mistakes of HOEPA, the North Carolina statute
covers a broader range of loans."' The statute accomplishes this by lowering the
trigger for total points and fees." 2 While many consumer advocate groups tout
North Carolina's statute as a success, 133 the statistics bear a different story. Since the
enactment of the statute, North Carolina has seen an increase in the growth of
subprime lending that parallels the rise in states that have not adopted similar regu-
lations. " 4 Not only has the number of subprime loans increased since the North
Carolina legislature enacted the statute in 1999, but every significant subprime
lender in North Carolina has continued to do business since. 131
In addition, state regulation which goes too far runs the risk of angering "privi-
leged raters." Privileged raters are the three major bond and securities rating agen-
cies: Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Service, and Fitch Ratings. 36 Privileged
raters will not rate securities backed by pools of residential mortgages if any of
those mortgages violate their rating guidelines.'37 Thus, if a state allows assignee
liability and unqualified damages-in effect eliminating holder in due course sta-
tus-some privileged raters refuse to rate that state's mortgage loans, effectively
shutting down the mortgage market in states with strong anti-predatory lending
legislation. 31
IV. A NEW APPROACH: UNCONSCIONABILITY
Academics and scholars alike recognize the problems associated with current regu-
lations. 139 In response to regulatory failures, legislators and scholars have proposed
a myriad of new theories and ideas. 4 Many of these ideas focus on altering the
regulatory field as well as the mortgage market. 4 ' Scholars, however, too quickly
129. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1308 (noting that a handful of states have responded
to the problem of evading HOEPA, by adopting measures patterned after HOEPA to a large degree).
130. Reiss, supra note 5, at 1028.
131. Forrester, supra note 35, at 1320 (indicating that the North Carolina Statute goes "beyond" the protec-
tions provided by HOEPA).
132. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1308.
133. Forrester, supra note 35, at 1320.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Reiss, supra note 5, at 987.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1032 (noting that this very situation occurred in Georgia).
139. See supra Parts III.B.-C.
140. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 60, at 2273 (proposing the reformation of consumer protection laws); see
also Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1363-64 (arguing for increased regulation of mortgage
brokers and appraisers).
141. See supra note 140.
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dismiss common law remedies, 42  particularly the contract defense of
unconscionabiity."'43
There are three problems with using the theory of unconscionability to resolve
the predatory lending problem.'44 First, since investors in the secondary market are
often responsible for suing borrowers who fail to pay their loans, borrowers are
prohibited from raising the defense of unconscionability due to the holder in due
course doctrine.141 Under that doctrine, a secondary market purchaser receives the
mortgage from the lender free and clear of defenses. 46 The "waiver of defense
clauses" serves as another obstacle.'47 Finally, scholars have, somewhat incorrectly,
pointed to the reluctance of courts to condemn excessive price as unconscionable
"without more"--it is this problem which this comment confronts head on. 41
At first glance, all of these legitimate problems appear to justify the reluctance to
use the defense of unconscionability. However, examining the doctrine of uncon-
scionability from a different angle diminishes or eliminates the third problem, the
price term argument."' Although unconscionability does not diminish the holder
in due course doctrine or the waiver of defense clause, these doctrines are not as
determinative as one may think.' Recently, because of public policy concerns,
courts have begun to chip away at the foundation of the holder in due course
doctrine and the waiver of defense clause. 5'
A. Unconscionability
The equitable concept of unconscionability, found in section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, states:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
142. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1299-1301 (describing the limitations of the contract
defense of unconscionability).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1301.
145. Id.
146. Id. "[A] secondary-market purchaser can defeat 'personal' defenses [only] if it meets the following
requirements for a holder in due course: (1) the purchaser is the holder, (2) of a negotiable note, (3) who took
the note for value (4) in good faith, and (5) without notice of the defenses." Id.
147. ALLEN E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 11.8 (4th ed. 2004) ("Instead of using a separate promissory
note, financial institutions sometimes had retailers include in the contract of sale itself a clause known as a
'waiver-of-defense' clause .... Under such a clause the consumer agreed that, should the right to payment be
assigned, the consumer would not set up any defenses against the assignee.").
148. Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1300.
149. See infra Part IV.C.
150. See Peterson, supra note 60, at 2234-37 (describing how "courts have developed a variety of mecha-
nisms for allowing consumers to prevent enforcement of a waiver of defense clause, or deprive a loan assignee
of holder in due course status").
151. Id.
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the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any uncon-
scionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.'
Although section 2-302 only governs "transactions in goods," numerous courts
have applied it, "either by analogy or by expression of general doctrine, to many
other kinds of contracts.' 5 3
Even though there exists no precise definition of unconscionability, the court in
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.' 54 provided one of the more lasting defi-
nitions, defining unconscionability as "an absence of meaningful choice on the part
of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable
to the other party."155 Phrased another way, unconscionability has both a procedu-
ral and substantive element.5 6 As courts refined the definition articulated by the
Williams court, "an absence of meaningful choice" became synonymous with pro-
cedural unconscionability and "unreasonably favorable" likened to substantive un-
conscionability'5 An absence of meaningful choice "encompass[es] not only the
employment of sharp bargaining practices and the use of fine print and convoluted
language, but [also] a lack of understanding and an inequality of bargaining power
. ...."Is' Substantive unconscionability arises where contractual terms are overly
harsh or one-sided.'59 Thus, while procedural unconscionability is concerned with
the element of unfair surprise, substantive unconscionability deals with contracts
or contractual provisions which are so unfair that they shock the conscience.
It is now common practice for courts to require a complaining party to demon-
strate that the contract is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. 6
Each element, however, does not necessarily have to be to the same degree.'6' As
Judge Mosk stated in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.,16 2
"[e]ssentially a sliding scale test is invoked [by the courts] .... [T]he more substan-
tively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionabil-
152. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1998).
153. FARNSWORTH, supra note 147, § 4.28.
154. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
155. Id. at 449.
156. FARNSWORTH, supra note 147, § 4.28.
157. Id. See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting A&M
Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)) (stating that unconscionability refers
to "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party"); Stepp v. NCR Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 826, 836 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
(citing Raasch v. NCR Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 847, 860 (S.D. Ohio 2003)) (noting that a party must demon-
strate both substantive unconscionability by showing respectively that the contract terms are so unfair, and by
showing that there was an absence of meaningful choice).
158. FARNSWORTH, supra note 147, § 4.28.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Margaret M. Smith, Comment, Adhesion Contracts Don't Stick in Michigan: Why Rory Got it Right, 5
AVE MARIA L. REv. 237, 247 (2007).
162. 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
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ity is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice
versa."1 63 Significantly, however, some courts have found a contract unconscionable
based on its substantive terms alone. 64 To that end, courts have ruled that the
combination of gross excessiveness of price combined with the purchaser's un-
awareness of that fact is enough to find a contract unconscionable. 165 Additionally,
courts have found a contract unconscionable based solely on procedural grounds
when the process "rises to the level of misrepresentation, duress, or undue influ-
ence . ..."166
B. Waiver of Defense Clause and the Holder in Due Course
In general, "[an] assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor."1 67 The default rule in
the mortgage market remains unchanged.1 61 In other words, the purchaser in the
secondary market, the assignee, "takes subject to the claims and defenses that the
borrower might assert against the original lender.1 69 However, the waiver of de-
fense clause and the holder in due course doctrine marginalize an assignee's legal
liability. 7 ° Both rules-the waiver of defense clause and the holder in due course
doctrine-have the same basic purpose of denying the borrower the use of contract
defenses. 7'
Financial institutions in the secondary market (assignees) often have lenders in-
clude in the contract of sale a waiver of defense clause.' "Under such a clause the
[borrower] agree[s] that, should the [mortgage] be assigned," the borrower will not
assert any defense against the assignee."' For the most part, courts have upheld the
doctrine under the basic premise "that after the financial institution has given value
163. Id. at 690.
164. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995) (holding dual requirement
"more coincidental than doctrinal"); Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360-61 (Utah 1996) ("Gross disparity in
terms, absent evidence of procedural unconscionability, can support a finding of unconscionability." (quoting
Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985))); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 147, § 4.28.
165. See, e.g., Ahern v. Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787, 788, 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) ("Gross excessiveness of price
alone can make an agreement unconscionable"); Sho-Pro of Ind., Inc. v. Brown, 585 N.E.2d 1357, 1358, 1361
(Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (asserting that a home improvement contract is unconscionable when there is an unrea-
sonable difference between the price charged and the fair market value of the services rendered); Kugler v.
Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 652 (N.J. 1971) ("[An exorbitant price ostensibly agreed to by a purchaser of the type
involved in this case... constitutes an [unreasonable] bargain from which such a purchaser should be relieved
under Section 2 [of the Uniform Commercial Code]"). Commentators debate whether this scenario encom-
passes both substantive and procedural terms alone or an example of courts finding a contract unconscionable
based solely on substantive elements. CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.40 (5th ed. 2003).
166. FARNSWORTH, supra note 147, § 4.28.
167. Id. § 11.8 (noting that for the most part the aforementioned metaphor-"the assignee stands in the
shoes of the assignor"--is an accurate generalization); see also James Talcott, Inc. v. H. Corenzwit & Co., 387
A.2d 350 (N.J. 1978).
168. Peterson, supra note 60, at 2233.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. FARNSWORTH, supra note 147, § 11.8.
173. Id.
VOL. 4 NO. 2 2009
PREDATORY LENDING: WHAT WILL STOP IT?
in reliance on such a clause," the court should prohibit the consumer (borrower)
from asserting contract defenses against financial institutions in the secondary
market.174
A second qualification from the traditional common law rule-that "the assignee
stands in the shoes of the assignor"-is the holder in due course doctrine. 7 ' This"rule states that if the assignee, in good faith, paid value for a negotiable promis-
sory note, and lacked notice that the loan is in default . . . , then the assignee is
considered a holder in due course."'76 Although the assignee will still be subject to
"real defenses," including infancy and duress, the financial institution-assignee-
will take the mortgage free and clear of many of the defenses which can be used by
a borrower to avoid the effects of predatory lending, including that of unconsciona-
bility.177 If the assignee is considered a holder in due course, courts are disinclined
to allow borrowers to defeat predatory contracts by pursuing claims against the
owner of their loans-namely those in the secondary mortgage market. 71 Courts,
instead, instruct the borrower to pay the mortgage or go into foreclosure and at
that point seek redress against the original lenders, an unacceptable option for
many borrowers.179
In recent years, for public policy reasons, the courts began to chip away at the
absolute effect of both the holder in due course doctrine and the waiver of defense
clause.' As the Supreme Court of Florida stated when it addressed the waiver of
defense doctrine, "[w] e believe the finance company is better able to bear the risk of
the dealer's insolvency than the buyer and in a far better position to protect his
interests against unscrupulous and insolvent dealers."'' Numerous courts have
echoed this very point refusing to enforce the waiver of defense clause solely on
public policy grounds. 2 Fearing the case in which the waiver of defense clause
survives an assault by the courts, most states enacted statutes applicable to con-
sumer transactions prohibiting the waiver of defense clause, limiting their effective-
ness, or depriving them of effect altogether.'83
174. Id. (noting that the argument in favor of the "waiver of defense" clause is premised on free
assignability).
175. Peterson, supra note 60, at 2233.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2234.
181. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953).
182. Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 264 A.2d 547 (Conn. 1969) (noting the use of a waiver of defense
clause is "[a]n attempt to evade the clear prerequisites of negotiability"); Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley 148 N.E.2d
385, 389 (Mass. 1958) ("[A] blanket provision like the waiver clause ... should be disregarded as contrary to
[policy]"); see also Peterson, supra note 60, at 2234.
183. FARNSWORTH, supra note 147, § 11.8. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1804.2 (West 1998).
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As is the case with the waiver of defense doctrine, the courts, as of late, have
scrutinized the holder in due course rule with renewed vigor."s The courts and
UCC effectively limited the holder in due course doctrine by ensuring that an as-
signee meets a litany of technical requirements.' For example, the transfer of the
negotiable instrument must be "negotiated" to the assignee requiring the transferor
to endorse the instrument "either by writing on the paper itself or firmly affixing
an 'allonge' . . . .186 In a perfectly regulated industry, many of the technicalities
would have little effect but "[i]n the subprime mortgage market, some businesses
have been less than perfect in correctly endorsing their notes," giving borrowers the
ability to assert the defense of unconscionability against the assignee.'87 Moreover,
the courts refuse to allow financial institutions to benefit from holder in due course
status when the institution remains closely connected to the original lender. 8' Fi-
nally, a developing body of case law denies holder in due course status to the as-
signee if, "in one way or another, the assignee had notice of the [borrower's]
defenses or was otherwise culpable in the [loan] originator's [predatory] behav-
ior."'8 9 Although the courts have not completely eliminated the holder in due
course doctrine, that same doctrine's ability to protect assignees has been substan-
tially diminished. 9
C. Looking in Unexpected Places: Unconscionability
A contract is unconscionable if it is predatory; this simple statement best illustrates
the approach advocated for by this comment. Although simple, this theory still
leaves some basic questions unanswered. First and foremost, is there any legal foun-
dation or support for such a theory? Secondly, how do we determine when a con-
tract is predatory and thus unconscionable as a matter of law? Moreover, what
remedies does the unconscionability doctrine provide a borrower? Put another way,
how is a borrower who has been affected by predatory lending benefited by the
defense of unconscionability? Finally, have courts ever applied such a theory in
other areas of the law?
Under a subsection of the unconscionability doctrine known as price unconscio-
nability, gross excessiveness of price is itself unconscionable. 9' Various claims,
some successful, under such a doctrine have emerged in an array of different trans-
actions, including "rent-to-own contracts, loans and interest charges, royalties and
rents, commodities prices, water bills, and contracts" in numerous other services.'92
184. Peterson, supra note 60, at 2234.
185. Id. at 2235. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-302 (2003).
186. Peterson, supra note 60, at 2236.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2236-37.
189. Id. at 2236.
190. See supra notes 184-89.
191. Frank P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 HouSING L. REV. 1819, 1820 (1994).
192. Id. at 1821.
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Nevertheless, both courts and scholars have been increasingly skeptical of price
unconscionability."' For example, in describing such cases, scholar Frank Darr
commented that "[sluccessful claims often resemble nothing more than judicial
attempts to protect gullible consumers from extortionate prices."'94 Judge Bracher,
in Carpenter v. Suffolk Franking Savings Bank,'95 put it this way:
[n]o doubt the contracts between the [mortgagors] and the bank were "adhe-
sion" contracts, but we are not prepared to hold that they were unconscionable
in the aspects here in issue .... Customers who adhere to standardized con-
tractual terms ordinarily "understand that they are assenting to the terms not
read or not understood, subject to such limitations as the law may impose.'96
Underlying this criticism is the belief that the doctrine of unconscionability, as
outlined in Williams,197 requires both procedural and substantive elements as op-
posed to only procedural unconscionability-which is the case with the price un-
conscionability doctrine. 9
More frequently, possibly in an attempt to subvert the criticisms of the price
unconscionability doctrine, courts have limited the doctrine, finding a contract un-
conscionable only when gross excessiveness of price combines with a purchaser's-
borrower's-unawareness of the excessive price terms.'99 Also note that such an
approach responds to the problems with using the theory of unconscionability to
resolve the predatory lending problem."' One may view these cases as having both
procedural and substantive unconscionability, or, put another way, such contracts
combine unfair terms, specifically excessive price terms, with a lender "unfairly
surprising" the borrower."'
In Ahern v. Knecht, °2 for example, a homeowner brought an action against a
repairman to recover for excessive repair charges.20 3 After condemning the excessive
price of the repair.. and noting the plaintiffs' ignorance of the procedures neces-
193. See infra notes 194-96.
194. Darr, supra note 191, at 1820.
195. 346 N.E.2d 892 (Mass. 1976).
196. Id. at 900.
197. 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (defining unconscionability as "an absence of meaningful choice on
the part of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party").
198. See Darr, supra note 191, at 1820 ("Generally, courts require the party asserting the unconscionability
defense to show both substantive and procedural unconscionability.").
199. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
201. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 165, § 9.40.
202. 563 N.E.2d 787 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
203. Id. at 788.
204. Id. The repairman charged the plaintiff a total of $762 for the repairs. Id. The court stated that the
repairman should have charged $150 for the work that was done. Id.
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sary to repair an air conditioner, the court proceeded to hold the contract uncon-
scionable, specifically stating,
[i]n view of the consumer's lack of experience in this type of transaction, the
defendant's substantial charge ... [and] his representations ... persuades us
that there was more than sufficient evidence for the trial court to set aside the
unconscionable terms of the agreement and to allow defendant what it deter-
mined to be the actual value of his services."°
Courts everywhere employ the same rationale, finding contracts unconscionable
when they contain an excessive price provision combined with a consumer's igno-
rance of that fact." 6 Although, to this point, the courts have not applied this princi-
ple to predatory contracts or the mortgage market in general, one can easily
imagine a repairman replaced by a lender, a borrower unaware of the complexities
of the mortgage market in place of consumers unaware of the ins and outs of
heating repairs, and an exorbitant interest rate or balloon payment substituted for
an excessive repair cost." 7
If anything, the disparities involved in predatory lending are even greater than
those in basic consumer transactions. The substance of a predatory contract tends
to contain an abundance of complicated terms, including interest rates, payment
plans and penalties, balloon payments, and appraisals."0 Compounding the prob-
lem is that most borrowers entering into these contracts are relatively unsophistica-
ted and rarely enter into the most basic of contracts, let alone understand what it
means to enter into a contract in the complex mortgage market." 9 In essence, the
borrowers who are regularly the targets of predatory lending stand to lose signifi-
cantly more than a consumer in a basic consumer contract and these same borrow-
ers are just as incapable of recognizing the excessive fees hidden within a predatory
loan."'
Applying the logic followed by the court in Ahern2"' to the problem of predatory
lending provides future courts with a means with which to hold predatory con-
tracts unconscionable. The obvious problem this presents is determining when a
205. Id. at 793.
206. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 165, § 9.40 & n.6; see also supra note 165 and accompanying text.
207. See Eggert, supra note 1, at 514-22 (discussing balloon payments and excessive prepayment penalties).
208. Id. at 513.
209. Susan E. Hauser, Predatory Lending, Passive Judicial Activism, and the Duty to Decide, 86 N.C. L. REv.
1501, 1509 (2008) ("Compounding the abuse, predatory lending practices have been heavily marketed to
groups perceived by lenders as financially unsophisticated, including low-income, elderly, and minority bor-
rowers." (footnotes omitted)).
210. Id.; see also Laura Dietrich, Note, Massachusetts' New Predatory Lending Law and the Expanding Rift
Between Federal and State Lending Protection, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 169, 179 (2006) (noting "[tihe harm-
ful effect of predatory lending practices on American homeowners is massive" (emphasis added)); Eggert, supra
note 1, at 507 (noting that predatory lending results in foreclosure).
211. 563 N.E.2d 787 (11. App. Ct. 1990).
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mortgage contract becomes predatory and thus as a matter of law unconsciona-
ble.2"2 As mentioned, under the unconscionability doctrine a lending practice is
predatory if and only if a lending contract includes (1) unfair or excessive "price
terms" along with (2) a borrower's unawareness of such terms and conditions.1 3
Fortunately, the existence of these two elements-unfair price terms in combina-
tion with a borrowers surprise to find such terms-is universal to the practice of
predatory lending. 214
As discussed, predatory lending takes the form of many different practices.1 5 No
matter what practice or technique a predatory lender wishes to engage, at the heart
of predatory lending are "fees and interests rates far greater than necessary to pro-
vide a reasonable, market-driven rate of return to the lender given the risk of lend-
ing to that particular borrower. '"26 Put simply, unreasonable fees and interest rates
are a necessary element of predatory lending.2 7 For example, a practice common to
predatory lending is "high pressure and misleading sales and marketing tech-
niques"-an approach that seems benign when it comes to fees and interest.2 8
However, the point of such an approach is to force or pressure a borrower to sign a
loan with unreasonable interest rates.2" 9 The practices of "stripping," "flipping," and
"packing" all involve the use of interest rates and fees which are disproportionate
and unreasonable compared to the borrower's risk and needs.22' The same holds
true of balloon and penalty payments often hidden within the predatory con-
tract.22' In sum, almost universally, predatory lending encompasses exorbitantly
high interest rates and fees, thus satisfying the first requirement of unconscionabil-
ity, as laid out by the courts.2 2
If a borrower is aware of the use of oppressive price terms, then a lending prac-
tice does not qualify as predatory.2 3 Providentially, almost without exception, every
court and scholarly "definition" of predatory lending demands that a borrower is
212. See supra Part I (noting the difficulty in defining predatory lending).
213. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 165, § 9.40; see also supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
214. See infra notes 215-29 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
216. Eggert, supra note 1, at 514.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 516.
219. Id. (describing practices used by predatory lenders).
220. Ferguson, supra note 3, at 609-10. "Packing" is the practice of forcing or inducing borrowers to use
some of their loans' proceeds to pay for unnecessary or undesired products, such as single premium credit life
insurance. Id. An especially damaging form of predatory lending is the origination of loans by a lender who has
no reasonable expectation that the borrowers can repay them. Id. Lending to borrowers who cannot repay the
loans is known as "equity stripping." Id. Flipping is the early or frequent refinancing of a loan, normally with
each new set of loan fees financed by the loan, so that the loan amount continually rises, even while the
homeowner makes her payments. Id.
221. Eggert, supra note 1, at 519-20.
222. See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
223. See infra notes 214-29 and accompanying text.
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unaware of the oppressive terms within the contract.224 In American Financial Ser-
vices Ass'n v. Toledo225 for example, the court understood predatory lending to "in-
volve[] the use of fraud or deception, manipulation of the borrower through
aggressive sales tactics, or taking unfair advantage of a borrower's lack of under-
standing of loan terms." '226 Similarly, in In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.,227 the
court characterized predatory lending as "the practice of making loans containing
interest rates, fees or closing costs that are higher than they should be in light of the
borrower's credit and net income, or containing other exploitative terms that the
borrower does not comprehend."22" These consistent characterizations lend support
to the same result, namely that a borrower who is subject to predatory lending is de
facto unsophisticated and consequently unaware of the excessive price, high interest
rates or other "unfair" terms hidden within the contract.229
Looking back, it is no surprise that predatory lending universally encompasses
both excessive price terms and a borrower's unawareness of such terms.23° After all,
the goal of predatory lenders is to turn a significant and unreasonable profit by
providing loans to, as one prominent individual put it, anyone that "could fog up a
mirror, if you had red blood running through your veins, they would lend you
money."23' To accomplish such a goal, predatory lenders need to "coerce or trick
homeowners into obtaining loans with interest rates or fees higher than the bor-
rowers' credit profiles and the market would justify or loans larger than or different
from what the borrowers need, want or can afford."232 Such an approach demands
both excessive fees and a borrower's ignorance.233
Although an argument that a contract is unconscionable if it is predatory may
seem somewhat unique or foreign to contract law, courts implore a similar ap-
224. See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 3, at 1257 (defining predatory lending as the
practice of making "exploitative high-cost loans to naive borrowers" (emphasis added)); Rashmi Dyal-Chand,
Exporting the Ownership Society: A Case Study on the Economic Impact of Property Rights, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 59, 83
n.120 (2007) (commenting that predatory lending "is the use by lenders of deceptive, manipulative, or coercive
practices in order to induce borrowers to accept loans that (1) have interest rates or fees significantly above the
current market rate given the risk profile of the borrowers or other terms significantly worse than the market
norm offered by legitimate lenders, or (2) which leave the borrowers worse off than they would have been
without any new loans, or (3) both." (emphasis added)); see also infra notes 225-28.
225. 830 N.E.2d 1233 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 859 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio 2006).
226. Id. at 1238.
227. 471 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006).
228. Id. at 984.
229. See Eggert, supra note 1, at 507.
230. See infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
231. Eggert, supra note 1, at 506 ("Ronald J. Michnik, president of the Western New York Association of
Mortgage Brokers, referring to the mortgage originating arm of United Companies Financial Corp., reported in
High Risk Loan Disaster a Bankrupt Mortgage Lender from Baton Rouge, La., Which Gave High-Risk Loans to
People with Damaged Credit Ratings, Owns 126 Neglected Houses in Buffalo, BUFF. NEWs, Dec. 17, 2000, at C5,
2000 WL 5703112.").
232. Id. at 507.
233. Id. at 507, 633.
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proach and logic to contracts of adhesion. 34 Courts and legal scholars alike define
an adhesion contract as "a standardized contract, imposed and drafted by a party
with superior bargaining power, which relegates to the subscribing party only the
opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it."23 As the court in Neal v. State
Farm Insurance Co.2"6 stated, such contracts do not "issue from that freedom in
bargaining and equality of bargaining which are the theoretical parents of the
American law of contracts."237 Adhesion contracts, however, are not necessarily un-
conscionable but only procedurally unconscionable, meaning they are not void or
voidable without some degree of substantive unconscionability." 8 Nonetheless, as
the court in Ting v. AT&T. 9 stated "[a] contract is procedurally unconscionable if
it is a contract of adhesion, i.e., a standardized contract, drafted by the party of
superior bargaining strength, that relegates to the subscribing party only the op-
portunity to adhere to the contract or reject it."'24 Such language indicates that a
theory holding predatory contracts unconscionable will find firm footing in the
jurisprudence of the United States courts.24'
The successful use of the unconscionability doctrine provides a buyer with a
litany of promising remedies. Particularly promising is the UCC242 permitting the
courts to refuse to enforce the contract, to excise an unconscionable clause, or to
limit the application of such a clause.243 Moreover, recently the courts expanded
upon the basic terms in the UCC by "remaking bargains by reducing price terms,
increasing a duration term, and reducing interest rates."244 Such remedies enable
the courts to renegotiate a predatory contract in order to ensure that its terms are
fair and equitable to all the parties involved, thus providing the buyer with an
opportunity to stave off imminent foreclosure.24
One can imagine, for example, a contract containing excessive interest rates. This
same contract could potentially include payment penalties or balloon payments
almost ensuring foreclosure.246 Couple such a contract with the borrower's un-
awareness of the oppressive interest rates and penalty payments and the result is an
234. Sierra David Sterkin, Comment, Challenging Adhesion Contracts in California: A Consumer's Guide, 34
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285, 298 (2004) ("The process of determining whether a contract is unconscionable is
directly linked to a determination that the contract is adhesive").
235. Id. at 289.
236. 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
237. Id. at 784.
238. See Sterkin, supra note 234, at 298 (noting in California, when a contract is found to be adhesive, that
contract is considered procedurally unconscionable).
239. 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
240. Id. at 1148.
241. See supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
242. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003).
243. Id.
244. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 165, § 9.39.
245. Id. § 9.38 (noting that unconscionability was developed primarily in equity).
246. Eggert, supra note 1, at 507, 518-20.
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unconscionable contract."' A court confronting such a contract, under the doc-
trine of unconscionability, could rewrite the oppressive terms in order to ensure
that the terms are fair and equitable to all parties, including the formerly oppressed
borrower.248 With a fair and equitable contract in hand a borrower can now afford
to make his regular mortgage payments and thus not only stave off foreclosure but
begin the process of owning a home, at least that is the hope.249
D. Qualifications
The unconscionability doctrine is not a perfect solution nor is it a substitute for
regulation. 5 ' Of course, costs associated with litigation may prevent a buyer from
ever entering the courtroom and thus deny him the opportunity to rebut enforce-
ment through the defense of unconscionability. s' Additionally, it is unlikely that
this theory will end the practice of predatory lending, but instead help borrowers
on a more individualized basis.2"2 To this point, however, regulation has been no
more effective in curtailing predatory lending.253 Moreover, like any regulation or
contract provision, one cannot be sure that an unsophisticated borrower will be-
come aware of this theory.5 In the end, no one, including me, can force a bor-
rower to know that he has recourse, or that the doctrine of unconscionability is
available to him.255 The implementation of this approach along with many others
can start to deter, if not altogether prohibit, lenders and individuals in the secon-
dary market from engaging in predatory tactics and in the process restore order to
the mortgage market.256
V. CONCLUSION
Predatory lending has devastated the mortgage market and as foreclosures rise,
politicians and scholars are in the unenviable position of finding a solution.2 7 The
ineffectiveness of regulations, specifically HOEPA, TILA and RESPA, only com-
pounds matters.25 8 A solution may be found in the courts through the use of con-
247. Id. at 507 (noting that predatory lending includes the borrower's ignorance of such terms).
248. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 165, § 9.39.
249. See id. (noting that a court can rewrite a contracts to make the terms more fair and equitable).
250. See supra Part IV.C. (discussing how unconscionability works with respect to predatory lending).
251. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It's Better Than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 783, 791 (2008) ("One of the key potential advantages of employment arbitration over litigation is that
the relatively high costs of litigation inhibit access to the courts by lower to mid-income ranges [sic]
employees.").
252. See supra Parts IV.A.-C.
253. See supra Part III.
254. See supra Parts IV.A.-C.
255. See, e.g., Merle H. Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic Violence, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 625 n.141 (2000) (noting poor women are generally unaware of legal remedies).
256. See supra Parts IV.A.-C.
257. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
258. See supra Part III.
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tract law and the doctrine of unconscionability.259 By no means will such an
approach eradicate the problems of predatory lending; more likely the defense of
unconscionability can serve as a useful supplement to regulation.26 ° Nonetheless,
scholars and politicians have for too long ignored the doctrine of unconscionability
as a way to resolve predatory lending; such a doctrine warrants at least a look.26" '
259. See supra Part IV.
260. See supra Part IV.D.
261. See supra Parts III.-IV.
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